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1 Introduction
1.1 From bounded to perfect rationality and back
Decision making is an important aspect of our daily lives. In some cases the
decisional process is rooted in the unconscious or genetically preprogrammed,
entailing an automatized selection among a set of available alternatives; in most
circumstances however, a sophisticated reasoning and a certain level of compu-
tational capacities are required. Although the reasoning process is innate in
the human mind since the dawn of mankind, the genesis of rationalism can be
traced back to the work of ancient Greek philosophers such as Aristotle’s Prior
Analytics on deductive reasoning or the dialogues of Plato and in a less distant
past Rene´ Descartes and his Discourse on the Method. In economic theory,
the term “rationality” has not the same meaning across time, such that if you
question Adam Smith and John Hicks about rational behavior, you will almost
surely get diﬀerent interpretations; the selfish wealth seeker for the classical era
and the utility maximizer for the neoclassical one.
Indeed, the idea of homo economicus spreads back to the work of John Stu-
art Mill’s essay “On the Definition of Political Economy; and on the Method
of Investigation Proper to It” [1] , in which the (rational) economic man is de-
fined as a being in the quest of wealth accumulation and leisure, endowed with
the capability of “judging the comparative eﬃcacy of means for obtaining that
end”. Thus, as highlighted by Persky [2], it would be a mistake to confound
Mill’s “rational man” abstraction with the neoclassical conception of rational-
ity whose core lies in the optimizing behavior. Likewise Adam Smith’s, The
Wealth of Nations [3] mentions individuals using their human capital in labor
to acquire reasonable compensations without mentioning any utility maximiza-
tion scheme.
Towards the end of the 19th century arises a paradigm shift from economic
agents targeting reasonable compensations from their labor as inspired by Adam
Smith and his contemporaries to a utility maximizing rational agent, the lat-
ter being the building block of methodological individualism. The neoclassical
vision of a perfectly rational agent becomes predominant during the first half
of the 20th century if not to say the unique rule in economic decision making.
Paraphrasing Herrnstein [4], the rationality assumption in economic theory can
be seen equivalent to the Newtonian theory of matter in the physical sciences,
i.e. the law that behavior would follow if not disturbed by idiosyncratic forces
or cognitive limitation, the behavioral analogues of friction or measurement
error. During this period, the distance between what Simon [5] labels “sub-
stantive” and “procedural” rationality becomes abyssal. A behavior is said to
be substantively rational when it aims at achieving well defined goals under a
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set of given constraints; hence rationality is in this definition tightly linked to
the objectives to be attained and remains silent about the processes of decision
to achieve them. On the other side, “behavior is procedurally rational when it
is the outcome of appropriate deliberation”, encompassing the reasoning and
cognitive processes of humans.
In the fifties, the papers of Arrow [6] and Debreu [7] brought a successful
axiomatic reformulation of the Walrasian general equilibrium theory based on
the perfect rationality assumption. At the same time Savage [8], proposes an
elegant Bayesian approach in which behavioral rationality is identified with sub-
jective expected utility maximization. Another breakthrough in the theory of
decision making is the pioneering work of John von Neumann and Oskar Mor-
genstern [9] in theTheory of Games and Economic Behavior that presents a new
analytical apparatus to cope with the interaction of rational agents in strate-
gic situations. A couple of years later, John Forbes Nash [10] developed the
solution concept of equilibrium points for non-cooperative games which is well
known as Nash equilibrium and is extensively used in game-theoretic analysis.
Ironically, when John Nash walked into the oﬃce of the Chair of the Prince-
ton Mathematics Department and presented his theory to von Neumann, the
latter scornfully remarked: “that’s trivial, you know, that’s just a fixed point
theorem”3 without being fully aware of the power of the theory and its future
applications to economics, political sciences, psychology and biology.
While the substantive rationality facet reached its climax in economics; in
other social sciences and especially in psychology, the arrival of improved ex-
perimental methods and new tools for statistical inference opened the gates to
procedural rationality, i.e. the study of cognitive processes. The critical punch
of Allais [11] towards the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility theory,
namely that preferences of individuals are insconsistent with the axioms of ra-
tional choice, oﬀered without doubt an enthusiastic promotion to the study of
psychological factors to enrich the theory of decision making. In the late 1950s,
while economic theory was molded in a mathematized shape of perfect ratio-
nality, cognitive psychology started to explore the mechanisms of thoughts by
means of experiments and new computer programs. According to Simon [12], it
is a diﬀerent conceptualization of rationality where the study of computational
strategies in the reasoning process is not less important than the understanding
of how emotions and other feelings interact to drive behavior.
The ambition of Simon [13] was to find the center of gravity between the
mythical fully rational man and an over-simplification of the latter, in other
words the aim was to marry substantive and procedural rationality to give
birth to a theory of bounded rationality. Important dimensions of bounded
3Nasar, S. (1998) A Beautiful Mind (Simon and Schuster, New York, p.94)
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rationality are the limited computational capacities of humans as well as the
restricted perception of their environment. To formalize this dimension, Simon
[13, 14] proposes a decision scheme based on “aspiration levels” rather than
classic maximization illustrated as follows. Let A be a point set of (objectively)
available alternatives. Subjectively, the human mind may be limited to perceive
a restricted set A˚ ⊂ A. The set of all possible outcomes is denoted by S and
we denote its power set by P(S) = {Sa|Sa ⊆ S}, such that under incomplete
information we have a mapping f : A → {Sa ∈ P(S)|Sa ￿= ∅}, meaning that a
given behavioral alternative a ∈ A˚ will lead to an outcome in the subset Sa.
Thus, limited information is here synonym of uncertainty among states of
the world in Sa. In order to simplify the decisional process, we can assume a
binary nature of the payoﬀ mapping, namely an indicator function IS(s) taking
the value 1 if the outcome s ∈ S is satisfactory and 0 otherwise. For instance in
chess, +1 would be assigned to a move which contributes to the development of
a winning strategy, while the 0 payoﬀ can be associated to a non-contributing
move towards checkmate, or an erroneous move giving advantage to the oppo-
nent. Finally, the bounded rational decision process consists in identifying a
subset S￿ ⊂ S of satisfactory outcomes and then search for a behavior alterna-
tive in A˚ that maps to outcomes being all elements of S￿. This procedure leads
to a satisfactory outcome with certainty (if it exists) and highlights Simon’s
important contrast between satisficing and maximizing strategies.
The introduction of psychological limits in economic decision making is less
associated to a behavioral revolution in the field than to a refined comeback
to the older classicist conception of limited rationality. In addition, the arrival
of laboratory experiments seriously shattered the flawed paradigm of “rational
man” and corroborated the bounded rationality theory pioneered by Simon.
Of particular importance is the experimental work of Tversky and Kahneman
[15, 16] that demonstrates how heuristic principles used by individuals are re-
sponsible for the biases in judging probabilities. Another challenge to the per-
fect rationality assumption is the so called framing eﬀect as highlighted by
Tversky and Kahneman [17] where two logically equivalent alternatives are not
necessarily treated equally depending on the context of choice, hence violat-
ing a core principle of rational choice called invariance. The development of
behavioral economics along with the accumulated empirical evidence for devi-
ations from the perfect rationality paradigm makes the sharp divide between
psychology and economics belong to the past and gives a chance to a synergistic
collaboration between the substantive and procedural rationality dimensions,
i.e. a connection between the rational and the psychological. The next section
discusses this connection in game-theoretic settings.
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1.2 Bounded rationality in Game Theory
Game theory is a set of mathematical tools for analyzing and predicting out-
comes of multiperson strategic interactions. In contrast to standard decision
theory where a single decision maker is involved, a game-theoretic setting incor-
porates a feature of strategic interdependence, such that each player’s welfare
depends not only on his own initiative, but also on those taken by other partici-
pants. Nash equilibrium (NE) is undoubtedly the dominant solution concept in
non-cooperative games and is based on the following rationality premises: (1)
strategic thinking, i.e., players form beliefs about the behavior of their rivals,
(2) optimization, that is, given their beliefs, players choose the actions that
maximize their expected payoﬀ and (3) mutual consistency which requires that
the belief of each player is consistent with the actual behavior of other players.
The NE solution concept is especially attractive for its generality, in the
sense that in a game where each player has a finite pure strategy set and is
allowed to play mixed strategies, the existence of a NE is guaranteed. However,
equilibrium analysis is often criticized for its unrealistic assumptions on players’
high degree of rationality. Driven by the accumulated empirical evidence on the
poor predictive power of NE in many settings (see Camerer [18] for a complete
experimental work on multiperson interactions), the research community has
proposed various theories of bounded rationality that have shown to make more
accurate predictions than NE in various experimental games already, at the cost
of introducing an additional free parameter to which is attributed psychological
and cognitive interpretations.
Instead of abandoning equilibrium analysis, the idea is to enrich it by incor-
porating limits on rationality as in the tradition of Simon. The central point
is to capture “real life” behaviors by considering boundedly rational agents
that according to Williamson [19] are limited in their capacity in “formulating
and solving complex problems and in processing (receiving, storing, retriev-
ing, transmitting) information”. A first game-theoretic attempt to catalyze
human behavior via limited rationality and cognitive biases can be found in a
paper of Rosenthal [20] who presents an alternative behavioral theory for non-
cooperative games, namely that a player’s probability of adopting a strategy is
a monotone-nondecreasing function of his expected payoﬀ, such that players are
not exclusively restricted to the choice of best responses. In the same direction,
Beja [21] proposes the concept of “imperfect performance equilibrium” with the
idea that players fail to implement their target strategy because of inaccurate
computations or random errors. Implications of error-prone behavior on equi-
librium is also studied by Chen [22], who develops a rational novice model that
allows for non-optimal actions.
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The paper of McKelvey and Palfrey [23] gives a statistical facelift to bounded
rationality models by weakening the optimization assumption usually made in
equilibrium analysis and applying a new solution concept coined “Quantal Re-
sponse Equilibrium” (QRE) to normal form games. More specifically, they
use a parametric logit response function to model individual choice behavior
and compare QRE with other equilibrium concepts in two-person experimental
games. This approach has been complemented by Rogers, Palfrey and Camerer
[24] by introducing “skill” heterogeneity among players, such that the individ-
ual payoﬀ responsiveness parameter (or rationality index) varies across players.
This leads to a generalization of the QRE concept called Heterogeneous Quantal
Response Equilibrium (HQRE) in which the distribution of skill-types is com-
mon knowledge across players. Moreover, this paper makes a useful connection
between QRE and Cognitive Hierarchy (CH) theory pioneered by Camerer, Ho
and Chong [25]. CH theory keeps the assumption of best responding to be-
liefs, but relaxes the assumption of mutual consistency in the sense that players
mistakenly anticipate the behavior of their rivals in the game due to a limited
spectrum of strategic thinking. Choi, Gale and Kariv [26] apply QRE to the
study of social learning in networks. More precisely, the authors adapt the de-
cision rule of QRE models and undertake an empirical study to determine the
ability of agents to learn and rationally process the information available in the
network in which they belong.
It is important to emphasize that both QRE and CH class of models are
one-parameter empirical alternatives to NE that have proved to be successful
in predicting the observed systematic deviations from NE in a variety of games.
However, a limited feature of these models is that the sophistication level of
players is exogenous and identical across all players in the game. Even though
Rogers, Palfrey and Camerer [24] allow for players with heterogeneous types,
nothing is said about the formation of this heterogeneity. In light of experi-
ments done by Lieberman [27], O’Neill [28], Rapoport and Boebel [29] and Ochs
[30] that reveal a non-monotonic increase in the rationality index when games
are repeated, the aim of this paper is to develop a theory to endogenize the
learning of players.
2 Modelling bounded rationality with statistical re-
action functions
2.1 Motivation
A classical approach to predict human behavior in game theory is to utilize the
Nash equilibrium solution concept which relies on strict rationality assump-
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tions. Even if this approach is intuitively appealing and applicable to general
settings, there is a plethora of evidence that it cannot rationalize behavior in a
variety of experimental games. To circumvent this predictive mismatch McK-
elvey and Palfrey [23] proposed a statistical theory of equilibrium based on
quantal choice. The boundedly rational dimension of this QRE model lies in
the relaxation of the optimizing assumption, that is, players do not necessarily
succeed in choosing their payoﬀ maximizing alternative, but are more likely to
select better actions (i.e. those yielding higher expected payoﬀs) than worse
ones. In short, the framework keeps the mutual consistency assumption of ra-
tional expectations, but accommodates for noisiness in optimizing behavior.
According to the work of Luce [31] on individual choice behavior, a com-
mon specification of the quantal response structure is the logistic function
parametrized by a payoﬀ sensitivity parameter λ ∈ R++ to which is attributed
psychological insights. When λ → 0 players distribute the probability mass
uniformly over their pure strategy set with a total lack of sensitivity towards
expected gains. At the other extreme, when λ→∞ players are perfectly ratio-
nal with a high degree of sensitivity towards expected payoﬀs, such that they
will almost surely choose their best alternative. Thus, QRE is a generalization
of NE that nests the latter when the payoﬀ sensitivity is infinitely large.
In addition, the logistic quantal response function possesses the attractive prop-
erties of interiority, monotonicity and continuity. Interiority gurarantees that
choice probabilities are in the open interval ]0, 1[ , allowing for scenarios where
literally anything can happen, while monotonicity in expected payoﬀs implies
that a pure strategy with higher expected payoﬀ is chosen with higher prob-
ability than an action to which is associated a lower expected gain. The as-
sumption of continuity requires that small disturbances in a player’s strategy
will only cause slight changes in every other player’s strategy, hence avoiding
brutal jumps in choice probabilities. Under these conditions, the step functions
of best-responding players are replaced by smooth quantal response functions
reflecting “better-responding” behavior.
Since the groudbreaking work on QRE [23], there has been several imple-
mentations in game-theoretic settings, namely in all-pay auctions (Anderson,
Goeree and Holt [32]), alternating-oﬀer bargaining games (Goeree and Holt
[33]), posted-oﬀer markets (Acevedo [34]), coordination games (Anderson, Go-
eree and Holt [35]) and also in the study of individual behavior on the formation
of irrational bubbles (Moinas and Pouget [36]). In Section 2.2, we present the
formal structure of the quantal choice model and follow the philosophy of Mc-
Fadden [37] to derive the logistic quantal response function proposed by McK-
elvey and Palfrey [23]. For the sake of illustration, this section also provides an
application of logit QRE (LQRE) to a simple two-player zero-sum game.
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2.2 The quantal response model
Let ΓN =
￿
N, {∆Ai}ni=1, {ui(·)}ni=1
￿
be a strategic form game withN = {1, 2, ..., n}
a finite set of players , Ai = {ai1, ai2, ..., aiJi} is the set of strategies of player
i ∈ N consisting of Ji pure strategies and ui : A→ R represents the payoﬀ func-
tion of player i with A representing the Cartesian product A = A1 × ... × An,
such that a pure strategy profile is denoted by a = (a1, ..., an) ∈ A.
Let σi ∈ ∆Ai be a mixed strategy for player i ∈ N , which assigns to each
pure strategy aik ∈ Ai a probability 0 ≤ σik ≤ 1 that it will be played and
denote by ∆Ai =
￿
σi ∈ RJi |σik ≥ 0 for k = 1, 2, ..., Ji and
￿Ji
k=1 σik = 1
￿
the (Ji − 1) dimensional simplex of player i ∈ N , also called mixed extension
of Ai. In addition, we denote the product set of mixed extensions as follows
∆A = ∆A1 × ... × ∆An, with mixed strategy profiles σ = (σ1, ...,σn) ∈ ∆A.
Accordingly, given a mixed strategy profile σ ∈ ∆A, the expected payoﬀ of
player i ∈ N has a domain extended to ∆A and is given by:
ui(σ) =
￿
a∈A
￿ n￿
k=1
σk(ak)
￿
ui(a)
where σk(ak) is player k’s mixed strategy component associated to his pure
strategy ak in the outcome a ∈ A. Likewise, the expected gain of player i ∈ N
when playing pure strategy aij ∈ Ai is:
ui(aij ,σ−i) =
￿
a−i∈A−i
￿ n￿
k=1
k ￿=i
σk(ak)
￿
ui(aij , a−i)
where a−i = (a1, ..., ai−1, ai+1, ..., an) is the (n− 1) vector of pure strategies for
players other than i and σ−i is defined alike.
2.3 The logistic quantal response function
In order to introduce the structure underlying individual choice behavior, let
Ei = RJi be the space of expected payoﬀs related to strategies available to
player i ∈ N and let the product set Ξ = E1 × ... × En represent the entire
payoﬀ space for all players.
This allows us to define the map u¯ : ∆A→ Ξ as u¯(σ) = (u¯1(σ), ..., u¯n(σ)) with
a particular entry being u¯ij(σ) = ui(aij ,σ−i).
Next, consider that each player’s expected gain for each pure strategy is
disturbed by a random term as follows:
uˆij(σ) = u¯ij(σ) + Eij
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The rationale behind this disturbance is that players act as statisticians and
provide an estimation of the expected payoﬀ for each action, such that the ran-
dom term Eij is interpreted as a subjective estimation error. An alternative
interpretation following Beja [21] is that players have a target strategy they
would like to adopt but fail to do so because of computation errors.
Furthermore, let us denote player i’s error vector by Ei = (Ei1, ..., EiJi) with
joint probability density function (pdf) fi(εi) and existing marginal distribu-
tions fij(εij) for each Eij with E(Ei) = 0. When these properties are satisfied
for all i ∈ N , we call f = {f1, ..., fn} a set of admissible error distributions.
Given this specification, the rule that governs individual choice behavior is that
each player will assign a probability mass to a pure strategy aij ∈ Ai according
to the plausibility of the event uˆij ≥ uˆik ∀k = 1, ..., Ji, k ￿= j. Mathematically,
for each i ∈ N and any u¯ ∈ Ξ, the ij-response set Rij ⊆ RJi is defined by
Rij(u¯i) =
￿
(εi1, ..., εiJi) ∈ RJi |u¯ij + εij ≥ u¯ik + εik ∀k = 1, ..., Ji, k ￿= j
￿
It follows that for any given mixed strategy profile σ ∈ ∆A and a joint PDF
fi, integrating the area above each region and below the density curve, one can
compute the probability that each player will assign to a given action. More
formally, the probability that player i ∈ N will choose pure strategy aij ∈ Ai
is given by:
σij(u¯i) =
￿
Rij(u¯i)
fi(εi) dεi
To graphically illustrate the relation between the response set Rij and the
choice probabilities, let us assume for simplicity that player i has two pure
strategies Ai =
￿
ai1, ai2
￿
with a vector of expected payoﬀs u¯i = (u¯i1, u¯i2) ∈ R2
where u¯i1 > u¯i2.
In addition, let us consider a vector of shocks Ei = (Ei1, Ei2) ∼ N2
￿
µ,
￿￿
drawn
from a bivariate standard normal distribution with mean µ = (0, 0)￿, covariance
matrix
￿
=
￿
1 0
0 1
￿
and joint density fi(εi) = (2π)−1 exp
￿− 12εtiεi￿. It follows
that the response set for the first pure strategy of player i is given by
Ri1 =
￿
(εi1, εi2) ∈ R2|εi2 ≤ (u¯i1 − u¯i2) + εi1
￿
=
￿
(εi1, εi2) ∈ R2|εi2 ≤ ∆u¯i + εi1
￿
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Figure 1: Illustration of a response set in R2
In Figure 1, the Ri1 response set of player i is represented by the dashed
surface, such that integrating the joint density over the latter gives us the
choice probability associated to pure strategy ai1 ∈ Ai, formally we have
σi1(u¯i1, u¯i2) =
￿ +∞
−∞
￿ ∆u¯i+εi1
−∞
fi(εi1, εi2) dεi2 dεi1
The property of monotonicity in expected payoﬀs, i.e. that actions with larger
expected gains are attributed more probability mass can also be noticed in Fig-
ure 1. Indeed, in this particular example when u¯i1 > u¯i2 the closed half-plane
Ri1 supports a larger portion of fi(εi) than Ri2, implying that σi1 > σi2.
It is also important to emphasize that the property of monotonicity is not
satisfied by any arbitrary disturbance distribution. In order to avoid anti-
rational behavior and have stochastic choice models that are suitable for em-
pirical analysis, an axiomatic approach to QRE has been proposed by Goeree,
Holt and Palfrey [38] in which common sense restrictions that are both in-
tuitively and economically convincing are imposed on choice probabilities to
obtain a regular quantal response function. In fact, without restricting the set
of possible error distributions and by considering completely general probabilis-
tic choice models with an additive random utility structure, Haile et al. [39]
have shown that any pattern of choice probabilities can be fitted perfectly.
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Thus, without restrictions on statistical response functions, quantal choice mod-
els would be empirically meaningless in the sense that there always exist an error
structure that perfectly matches the observed choice behavior of players.
Definition 1. (Goeree et al. 2005) σi : RJi → ∆Ai is a regular quantal response
function if it satisfies the following four axioms.
1. Interiority: σij(u¯i) > 0 ∀j = 1, ..., Ji and ∀u¯i ∈ RJi
2. Continuity: σij(u¯i) is continuous and diﬀerentiable ∀u¯i ∈ RJi
3. Responsiveness: ∂σij(u¯i)∂u¯ij > 0 ∀j = 1, ..., Ji and ∀u¯i ∈ RJi
4. Monotonicity: u¯ij > u¯ik ⇒ σij(u¯i) > σik(u¯i) ∀j, k = 1, ..., Ji and j ￿= k
An interesting parametric class of statistical response functions that emerges
frequently in the literature and satisfies all the four properties of Definition 1
is the logistic quantal response function which takes the following form
σij(u¯i) =
exp(λu¯ij)￿Ji
k=1 exp(λu¯ik)
(1.1)
where λ ∈ R++ is a parameter representing the “degree of rationality” (or payoﬀ
responsiveness) of players, so that when λ → 0 the probability distribution
becomes uniform σij → 1Ji ∀j = 1, ..., Ji representing a low degree of rationality,
while on the other side λ→∞means that players are infinitely sensible towards
their expected payoﬀs and will play their best response almost surely. Following
McFadden [37] and the early work of Marschak [40] and Luce and Suppes [41]
one can show that (1.1) is the resulting choice behavior when the underlying
error structure has an extreme value type-I distribution also called Gumbel
distribution with cumulative distribution function (cdf)
Fi(εij) = exp(− exp(−λεij − γ)) (1.2)
where λ > 0 is the scale parameter and γ is the Euler-Mascheroni constant 4.
In Lemma 1, we explore the relationship between the Gumbel error structure
and the logistic quantal response function in (1.1). The proof is given in Ap-
pendix.
Lemma 1. Assume that the error structure of player i ∈ N consists in i.i.d.
random shocks Ei1, ..., EiJi following the distribution given in (1.2). Then, the
quantal response function representing individual choice behavior takes the lo-
gistic form as specified in equation (1.1).
4We will consider Gumbel distributions where the location parameter is normalized to 0
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Taking the Gumbel distribution as an error structure also allows to capture
the property of unbiasedness, i.e. the estimate by player i ∈ N about the
expected gain of action aij ∈ Ai will on average be equal to the expected
payoﬀ associated to the latter strategy, which is computed from the equilibrium
probability distribution of other players. In addition, the variance of a player’s
estimated gain of adopting a particular pure strategy is o(λ−1), reflecting that
when learning (or experience) takes place through an increase of the rationality
index λ, a player is able to make more precise estimates of his expected payoﬀs.
The latter two statistical properties are shown in Appendix of this paper. Using
logistic reaction functions, a QRE is defined as follows.
Definition 2. Let ΓN =
￿
N, {∆Ai}ni=1, {ui(·)}ni=1
￿
be a game in normal form
where individual choice behavior follows a logistic quantal response function for
each player. A logit QRE (LQRE) is a mixed strategy profile σ∗ ∈ ∆A, such
that for all i ∈ N and 1 ≤ j ≤ Ji, we have
σ∗ij =
exp(λu¯ij(σ∗−i))￿Ji
k=1 exp(λu¯ik(σ
∗−i))
3 Endogeneous Quantal Response Equilibrium
3.1 Motivation for endogenizing learning eﬀects
In order to assess the goodness of fit of the logistic version of the QRE model,
[23] have explored several experiments on normal form games based on [27],
[28], [29] and [30]. The analyzed experiments consist in repeated two-person
games with unique Nash equilibria, where the total number of repetitions is
broken down in various “experience levels” containing a fixed number of suc-
cessive plays of the game. In each experience level, the rationality index λ is
estimated by maximum likelihood and the corresponding QRE is computed.
A salient feature regarding the evolution of the (estimated) rationality level
is its tendency to increase across game repetitions. This phenomenon can be
explained by a learning eﬀect in which players gain insights through repeated
observations of the actual payoﬀs received from choosing diﬀerent actions, such
that their estimation of expected payoﬀs becomes more accurate across time.
It is also important to emphasize that this increase is not systematic and in
some experiments λ remains relatively low even in later periods, indicating
non-convergence (or very slow convergence) towards the Nash equilibrium of
the game.
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The study of the evolution of the rationality index over repetitions of a
game is tightly related to learning curve theory which is prominent in the liter-
ature of psychology and psychometrics. A learning curve also called experience
curve can be defined as a graphical representation of how skills, knowledge and
experience evolve over time. According to [42], a typical curve of learning dis-
plays a strong rate of change in early periods followed by a deceleration to a
horizontal slope as practice advances. This approach is used by [43] in an ex-
perimental study of the centipede game, where an exponential learning curve
of the form ε(t) = ε exp(−δ(t − 1)) is used to model the decline of noisy play
with experience. In this parametric curve, ε is the initial error level, while δ is
the learning rate aﬀecting the convergence speed of errors to zero. [44] use a
similar parametric form for the rationality index λ(t) = λ exp(δ(t−1)) to study
a boundedly rational route choice model, where δ is again the rate of learning.
Modeling the rationality index dynamics by a learning curve may be a first
naive approach to endogenize learning. The exponential patterns proposed by
[43] and [44] are nevertheless too simplistic to capture the non-monotonic evo-
lution of λ over game repetitions. Hence, a first attempt to naively describe the
learning dynamics in the spirit of learning curve theory would be to propose
a refined law of motion for λ that allows for fluctuations/cycles in the error
structure governing player behavior. Another attempt to endogenize learning
eﬀects would be to allow for heterogeneous rationality where players are able
to choose their rationality level according to a cost-benefit tradeoﬀ. More pre-
cisely, players are allowed to have diﬀerent rationality indices and are able to
aﬀect their own rationality parameter via the choice of an eﬀort level to which
is associated a fixed marginal cost. This two approaches are developed in the
next sections.
3.2 Learning curve theory and the rationality index dynamics
A learning curve also called experience curve can be defined as a graphical rep-
resentation of how skills, knowledge and experience evolve over time.5Following
the observations of [42], the general shape of a learning curve displays a strong
rate of change in early periods and a decline of the improvement rate as the
number of periods increases. More recent experiments and results from psycho-
metrics tend to corroborate the flattening of the curve as practice advances. Of
course, the forms of the learning curves are wide ranging since they depend on
the system under study such that various shapes can be found in the literature,
namely, Sigmoid or exponential functions, logistic, Gompertz and von Berta-
lanﬀy functions.
5For a thorough discussion of the learning curve consult [45].
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A refined law of motion for the learning rate is given by the following non-
autonomous first-order diﬀerential equation:
λ˙(t) = δ(λ¯− λ(t)) +Ae−tτd [sin(ωt)(δ − τd) + cos(ωt)ω] ,
where [λ, λ¯] is a closed interval representing a player’s lower and upper bound
of his learning capacity with 0 < λ < λ¯ < ∞. The learning rate of a player
is represented by δ ∈ R++ and measures the speed of convergence towards his
upper bound λ¯ as periods unfold. A ∈ R++ measures the amplitude of the
cyclical component i.e. of fluctuations in λ and τd ∈ R++ is called damping
coeﬃcient and acts as a reduction in a player’s fluctuating behavior. Indeed,
as τd →∞ then the sine and cosine functions disappear implying a simple first
order diﬀerential equation whose solution is a smooth concave curve. Finally,
ω ∈ R++ stands for the frequency of the cyclical component and so represents
the frequency with which the rationality index undergoes fluctuations.
To find the rationality index dynamics, we need to solve the diﬀerential equation
λ˙(t) = f(t,λ(t)) given an initial condition λ(0) = λ , where the function f :
U → R is defined on a compact set U = [0, T ] x [λ, λ¯] in the euclidean space
R2. This means that we have a Cauchy problem which is formally written as:
￿
λ˙(t) = δ(λ¯− λ(t)) +Ae−tτd [sin(ωt)(δ − τd) + cos(ωt)ω]
λ(0) = λ
Proposition 1. There exists a unique solution to the Cauchy problem involving
the law of motion of the rationality index λ(t).
Proof. By rewriting the diﬀerential equation as λ˙(t)+Γ1(t)λ(t) = Γ2(t) with
the functions Γ1(t) = δ and Γ2(t) = δλ¯ + Ae−tτd [sin(ωt)(δ − τd) + cos(ωt)ω],
we see that ∀￿ > 0 both Γ1(t) and Γ2(t) are continuous functions on the open
interval 0 − ￿ < t0 < ∞ and so by the Linear Fundamental Theorem of Exis-
tence and Uniqueness, there exists a unique solution to the Cauchy problem on
the interval t ∈ [0,∞).
To obtain the analytical solution to the Cauchy problem, we first solve the
trivial homogeneous equation to get a general solution:
λ˙(t) = −δλ(t)
⇔ λ˙(t)
λ(t)
= −δ ⇔
￿
λ˙(t)
λ(t)
dt = −
￿
δdt
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⇔ lnλ(t) = δt+ c
⇔ λg(t) = Be−δt, B ∈ R
So, the general solution to the homogenous equation is λg(t) = Be−δt and
the second step consists in finding a particular solution with the time-varying
parameter B(t) such that we start our second step with λp(t) = B(t)e−δt and
taking the time derivative we obtain:
λ˙(t) = B˙e−δt − δBe−δt
and equating the latter with λ˙(t) = δ(λ¯−λ(t))+Ae−tτd [sin(ωt)(δ − τd) + cos(ωt)ω],
we get:
B˙(t) = δλ¯eδt +Ae(δ−τd)t sin(ωt)(δ − τd) +Ae(δ−τd)t cos(ωt)ω
⇔
￿
B˙(t)dt = δλ¯
￿
eδtdt￿ ￿￿ ￿
(I)
+A (δ−τd)
￿
e(δ−τd)t sin(ωt)dt￿ ￿￿ ￿
(II)
+A ω
￿
e(δ−τd)t cos(ωt)dt￿ ￿￿ ￿
(III)
(￿ ￿)
For the sake of clarity, we will solve (I), (II) and (III) separately:
The solution of (I) is trivial and immediate and gives us λ¯eδt.
The solution of (II) however is not immediate and requires twice the application
of integration by parts:
Let u(t) = e(δ−τd)t so that du(t) = (δ−τd)e(δ−τd)tdt and let us also take dv(t) =
sin(ωt)dt such that v(t) = − cos(ωt)ω . Integrating by parts gives us:
￿
e(δ−τd)t sin(ωt)dt =
−e(δ−τd)tcos(ωt)
ω
+
￿
(δ − τd)e(δ−τd)t cos(ωt)
ω
dt
⇔
￿
e(δ−τd)t sin(ωt)dt =
−e(δ−τd)t cos(ωt)
ω
+
(δ − τd)
ω
￿
e(δ−τd)t cos(ωt)dt
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Defining u(t) = e(δ−τd)t, du(t) = (δ − τd)e(δ−τd)tdt and dv(t) = cos(ωt)dt,
v(t) = sin(ωt)ω and integrating by parts a second time:
￿
e(δ−τd)t sin(ωt)dt =
−e(δ−τd)t cos(ωt)
ω
+
(δ − τd)
ω
￿
e(δ−τd)t sin(ωt)
ω
−(δ − τd)
ω
￿
e(δ−τd)t sin(ωt)dt
￿
⇔
￿
e(δ−τd)t sin(ωt)dt =
−e(δ−τd)t cos(ωt)
ω
+
(δ − τd)
ω2
e(δ−τd)t sin(ωt)−(δ − τd)
2
ω2
￿
e(δ−τd)t sin(ωt)dt
⇔
￿
(δ − τd)2 + ω2
ω2
￿￿
e(δ−τd)t sin(ωt)dt =
(δ − τd)
ω2
e(δ−τd)t sin(ωt)−e
(δ−τd)t cos(ωt)
ω
and hence the final result for (II) is:
￿
e(δ−τd)t sin(ωt)dt =
￿
(δ − τd)
(δ − τd)2 + ω2
￿
e(δ−τd)t sin(ωt)−
￿
ω
(δ − τd)2 + ω2
￿
e(δ−τd)t cos(ωt)
To derive the solution of (III), we define u(t) = e(δ−τd)t, du(t) = (δ−τd)e(δ−τd)tdt
and
dv(t) = cos(ωt)dt, v(t) = sin(ωt)ω and we integrate by parts:
￿
e(δ−τd)t cos(ωt)dt =
e(δ−τd)t sin(ωt)
ω
− (δ − τd)
ω
￿
e(δ−τd)t sin(ωt)dt
We again define u(t) = e(δ−τd)t, du(t) = (δ−τd)e(δ−τd)tdt and dv(t) = sin(ωt)dt,
v(t) = − cos(ωt)ω and integrate by parts a second time:
￿
e(δ−τd)t cos(ωt)dt =
e(δ−τd)t sin(ωt)
ω
−(δ − τd)
ω
￿
−e(δ−τd)t cos(ωt)
ω
+
(δ − τd)
ω
￿
e(δ−τd)t cos(ωt)dt
￿
from there, we apply the same manipulations as in (II) and we obtain the final
result for (III):
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￿
e(δ−τd)t cos(ωt)dt =
￿
ω
(δ − τd)2 + ω2
￿
e(δ−τd)t sin(ωt)+
￿
(δ − τd)
(δ − τd)2 + ω2
￿
e(δ−τd)t cos(ωt)
Gathering together (I), (II) and (III), we obtain the solution of equation (￿ ￿):
B(t) = λ¯eδt +Ae(δ−τd)t sin(ωt)
so that the particular solution to the non-homogenous diﬀerential equation is:
λp(t) = B(t)e
−δt = λ¯+Ae−τdt sin(ωt)
Hence, we can now combine the general solution to the homogeneous equation
and the particular solution to the non-homogeneous equation to obtain λ(t) =
λg(t) + λp(t) which gives us:
λ(t) = Be−δt + λ¯+Ae−τdt sin(ωt)
and the value of B can be discovered by the initial condition λ(0) = λ implying
that B = (λ − λ¯) such that our final solution for the rationality index is the
following:
λ(t) = λe−δt + λ¯(1− e−δt) +A sin(ωt)e−τdt
The above dynamics allows to incorporate fluctuation behaviors and cycles after
an appropriate calibration of the parameters.
3.3 The QRE model with endogeneous learning
Let ΓΛN =
￿
N, {∆, Ai}ni=1, {ui(·)}ni=1,Λ
￿
be a normal form game where Λ is the
population rationality level and belongs to some parametric family denoted by
P = ￿Pθ : θ ∈ Θ ⊂ Rd￿, where Pθ is a probability distribution on a non-
negative domain parametrized by the vector θ and represents a population of
players with heterogeneous skills. In period t = 1 each player i ∈ N is endowed
with an initial rationality level λ(t=1)i = λ
(1)
i drawn from Pθ. The logit QRE
in the first period is denoted by LQRE(1) and is computed using the initial
rationality endowment of the players. As the QRE model is a statistical model,
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we assume that players act as statisticians and estimate the rationality level
of their rivals. After the first play of the game each player observes the logit
equilibrium probability distributions (his own and that of his opponents). These
observations play the same role as a data sample in analogy with a statistical
model and will be used by each player to construct an estimator of his rival’s
rationality index. The estimator of player j of the rationality index of player
i ￿= j in period t ≥ 1 is defined as:
λˆ(t)i = λ
(t)
i + ηi|[−λ(t)i ,+∞)
(1.3)
Equation (1.3) means that player j’s estimate of player i’s rationality level
is equal to the true rationality level of player i in period t plus a noise with
a truncated normal distribution ηi ∼ N (0,σ2j ) on the domain [−λ(t)i ,+∞) ,
where σ2j = 1/
￿
λ(1)j . Note that the variance of the noise equals the inverse
square root of the initial rationality index of player j, such that the larger the
rationality endowment of player j, the less volatile is his estimator around the
true value λ(t)i . Another desirable characteristic of the estimator in (1.3) is that
it should have the property of consistency, i.e. both bias and variance of a
player’s estimator should decrease with his initial rationality endowment.
Definition 3. Player j’s estimator of player i’s rationality index in period
t ∈ N is asymptotically consistent if MSE￿λˆ(t)i ￿ = Bias2￿λˆ(t)i ￿+ V ar￿λˆ(t)i ￿→ 0
as λ(1)j → +∞.
Proposition 2. The belief structure in (1.3) is asymptotically consistent.
Proof. Let us denote the lower and upper bounds of the domain of the
distribution of the noise by a = −λ(t)i and b = +∞. In addition, let us define
α1 =
a−µ
σj
and α2 =
b−µ
σj
= +∞ where µ = 0 is the mean of the noise while the
standard deviation is σj =
￿
σ2j =
￿
1/
￿
λ(1)j . In addition, let φ and Φ denote
the pdf and cdf of a standard normal distribution Z ∼ N (0, 1).
We have Bias
￿
λˆ(t)i
￿
= E
￿
λ(t)i
￿ − λ(t)i = E￿ηi|[−λ(t)i ,+∞)￿ and for a truncated
normal distribution the latter expectation equals:
E
￿
ηi|[−λ(t)i ,+∞)
￿
= µ+ σj
φ(α1)
1− Φ(α1)
=
￿
1/
￿
λ(1)j
φ(α1)
1− Φ(α1)
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Letting λ(1)j → +∞ implies the following convergence φ(α1) → 0, Φ(α1) → 0
such that lim
λ(1)j →+∞
Bias
￿
λˆ(t)i
￿
= 0.
For the variance, we have V ar
￿
λˆ(t)i
￿
= V ar
￿
ηi|[−λ(t)i ,+∞)
￿
and for a truncated
normal distribution on [−λ(t)i ,+∞) this variance becomes:
V ar
￿
ηi|[−λ(t)i ,+∞)
￿
= σ2j
￿
1− α2φ(α2)− α1φ(α1)
Φ(α2)− Φ(α1) −
￿
φ(α2)− φ(α1)
Φ(α2)− Φ(α1)
￿2￿
and since α2 = +∞ it follows that:
V ar
￿
ηi|[−λ(t)i ,+∞)
￿
= 1/
￿
λ(1)j
￿
1 +
α1φ(α1)
1− Φ(α1) −
￿
φ(α1)
1− Φ(α1)
￿2￿
Accordingly, we have lim
λ(1)j →+∞
V ar
￿
λˆ(t)i
￿
= 0 and so
lim
λ(1)j →+∞
MSE
￿
λˆ(t)i
￿
= lim
λ(1)j →+∞
￿
Bias2
￿
λˆ(t)i
￿
+ V ar
￿
λˆ(t)i
￿￿
= 0 ￿
The statement in Proposition 1 is equivalent to the following convergence in
probability in a given period t, λˆ(t)i
P→ λ(t)i when λ(1)j → +∞.
We assume that a player is able to aﬀect his rationality index by choosing an
eﬀort level ei ≥ 0 to which is associated a fixed marginal cost γ > 0. In addition,
we assume that there exists a “mimick” behavior, i.e. a player’s rationality level
is attracted towards the estimated average rationality level of his opponents.
The expected payoﬀ of player j in period t+ 1 is defined as:
Et+1Uj = Ψj
￿
λ˜(t+1)j (e
(t+1)
j , λ¯
(t)
−j)
￿
− γe(t+1)j (1.4)
where Ψj is player j’s reward function of the rationality index λ˜
(t+1)
j chosen in
period t+1 and λ¯(t)−j =
1
(N−1)
￿N
k=1
k ￿=j
λˆ(t)k is the estimated average rationality level
of j’s opponents. In other words, the expected gain of player j in period t+1 is
assumed to depend on two key components, namely player j’s eﬀort level e(t+1)j
and the estimated average rationality level of his opponents λ¯(t)−j . Even though
at first glance of equation (1.4), there seems to be no relationship between Et+1Uj
and the payoﬀs of the game, note that each λˆk is actually an implicit or explicit
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function of the payoﬀs of the game. In fact, given the observed probability
distribution on the pure strategies of the players at time t and given the payoﬀs
of the game, one is able to determine via the logistic quantal response function
the true value of a player’s rationality index at time t. In that sense we have a
dependence structure between Et+1Uj and the payoﬀs of the game. For the sake
of clarity, consider the following generic payoﬀ matrix:
￿ σ21 1− σ21
σ11 a e b f
1− σ11 c g d h
￿
Let us define the following quantities z1 = c+b−d−a, z2 = d−b, z3 = f+g−h−e
and z4 = h− g. One can easily show that in this simple setting, there exists an
explicit relationship between the rationality index estimators (at time t) and
the payoﬀs as follows:
λˆ(t)2 = log
￿
1− σ(t)21
σ(t)21
￿￿
1
σ(t)11 z3 + z4
￿
+ η2|[−λ(t)2 ,+∞)
λˆ(t)1 = log
￿
1− σ(t)11
σ(t)11
￿￿
1
σ(t)21 z1 + z2
￿
+ η1|[−λ(t)1 ,+∞)
When the number of players and/or number of pure strategies exceeds 2, the
above relation is usually more complex.
The reward function in (1.4) is a map from a player’s rationality level in t+ 1
to a real number. Put more simply, it is a function acting as a utility derived
from rationality and satisfies the following conditions:
∂Ψj
∂λ˜(t+1)j
> 0
∂2Ψj￿
∂λ˜(t+1)j
￿2 < 0
In addition, we assume that the rationality index increases with eﬀort and that
the marginal increase in rationality from an additional unit of eﬀort falls with
the eﬀort level, resulting in a decreasing marginal benefit of eﬀort. The last
condition is a positive relationship between the estimated average rationality
level and the rationality level of player j.
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∂λ˜(t+1)j
∂e(t+1)j
> 0
∂2λ˜(t+1)j￿
∂e(t+1)j
￿2 < 0 ∂λ˜(t+1)j
∂λ¯(t)−j
> 0
In period t ≥ 2 a player j chooses his eﬀort level ej to maximize his expected
payoﬀ, such that the objective can be written as
max
e(t+1)j
Et+1Uj = Ψj
￿
λ˜(t+1)j (e
(t+1)
j , λ¯
(t)
−j)
￿
− γe(t+1)j (1.5)
The first order condition imposes that the marginal benefits from a rationality
level must be equal to marginal cost:
∂Ψj
∂λ˜(t+1)j
∂λ˜(t+1)j
∂e(t+1)j
= γ (1.6)
Equation (1.6) allows us to isolate the optimal eﬀort level e∗(t+1)j , such that the
optimal rationality level is λ˜∗(t+1)j = λ˜
(t+1)
j (e
∗(t+1)
j , λ¯
(t)
−j). Finally, we assume
that a player’s rationality level in period t+ 1 is sensitive towards his previous
period level at rate φj ∈ [0, 1], such that the rationality index chosen by player
j is written as
λ∗(t+1)j = λ˜
∗(t+1)
j + φj
￿
λ∗(t)j (1.7)
The above model allows us to define an enriched version of logit QRE where the
choice of the rationality index is endogenously determined by an eﬀort level.
Definition 4. Let ΓΛN =
￿
N, {∆, Ai}ni=1, {ui(·)}ni=1,Λ
￿
be a game in normal
form, where individual choice behavior follows a logistic quantal response func-
tion and where the population rationality level belongs to a parametric family
with a distribution on a non-negative domain. An Endogeneous Quantal Re-
sponse Equilibrium (EQRE) in period t ∈ N consists in a mixed strategy profile
σ∗(t) ∈ ∆A, such that for all i ∈ N and 1 ≤ j ≤ Ji, we have
σ∗(t)ij =
exp
￿
λ∗(t)i u¯ij(σ
∗(t)
−i )
￿￿Ji
k=1 exp
￿
λ∗(t)i u¯ik(σ
∗(t)
−i )
￿
where λ∗(t)i ∼ Pθ for t = 1, λ∗(t)i = λ˜∗(t)i (e∗(t)i , λ¯(t−1)−i ) + φi
￿
λ∗(t−1)i for t ≥ 2
and e∗(t)i determined by (1.6).
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3.4 Simulation study on some 2× 2 games
In this section, we explore the quantal response model with endogeneous learn-
ing in simulation studies involving simple 2 × 2 games. There are two players
N = {1, 2} and T = 100 periods. We assume a population of players with a
rationality level that is gamma distributed, Λ ∼ G(2, 0.4) and a unit marginal
cost of eﬀort γ = 1. In addition, we assume the following reward function
Ψi
￿
λ˜(t+1)i
￿
=
￿
λ˜(t+1)i where λ˜
(t+1)
i =
￿
e(t+1)i
￿1/2￿
λˆ(t)j
￿1/2
i ￿= j and a sensitivity
parameter φi = 1 for i = 1, 2. Under this specification, it can easily be shown
that the optimal eﬀort level resulting from (1.6) is given by:
e∗(t+1)i =
￿
λˆ(t)j
￿(1/3)
(4γ)(4/3)
i ￿= j (1.8)
It follows that the rationality index of player i will have the following dynamic:
λ∗(t+1)i =
￿
λˆ(t)j
4γ
￿2/3
+ φi
￿
λ∗(t)i i ￿= j for t = 1, ..., T − 1. (1.9)
The first game (Game 1) that we consider is the following zero-sum game:
￿ σ21 1− σ21
σ11 −1 1 0 0
1− σ11 0.5 − 0.5 −1 1
￿
As can be observed in Figure 2, the model is able to reproduce some exper-
imental characteristics of learning. Figure 2 (a) shows the evolution of the
rationality index of each player across periods t = 1, ..., 100. We see that the
rationality index of each player strongly increases in early periods reflecting
a large propensity to learn in the first repetitions of the game as suggested
by [42]. Note also that there is a stabilization pattern, i.e. after the increase
the rationality index of both players has a stochastic fluctuation between two
bounds (here between 1.5 and 2.5). Figure 2 (b) represents the time series of
the EQRE, i.e. the series of equilibrium probabilities σ∗(t)11 and σ
∗(t)
21 . The equi-
librium probabilities with endogeneous learning do not converge to the Nash
equilibrium of the game Nm =
￿
(3/5, 2/5), (2/5, 3/5)
￿
even in later periods.
This lack of convergence can be explained by the presence of a marginal cost of
eﬀort γ in equation (1.9).
From the latter equation, it can be seen that as the marginal cost of eﬀort
vanishes, γ → 0, the rationality index of a player will grow larger with the
implication that the EQRE will converge to the Nash equilibrium of the game.
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This situation is illustrated in Figure 3, where we make the same simulation ex-
ercise with a low marginal cost of eﬀort γ = 0.05. Under these circumstances,
the rationality index increases relatively fast as shown in Figure 3 (a). Fur-
thermore, in Figure 3 (b), we see that the EQRE has converged to the Nash
equilibrium after 4 periods.
We also apply the endogeneous quantal response model on the coordination
game of the battle of the sexes, where the payoﬀ matrix is given by
￿ C σ21 D 1− σ21
C σ11 2 1 0 0
D 1− σ11 0 0 1 2
￿
where C and D stand for coordination and non-coordination respectively. This
game has two pure strategy Nash equilibria, namely Np = {(C,C), (D,D)}
and a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium Nm =
￿
(2/3, 1/3), (1/3, 2/3)
￿
. Figure 4
shows the results of the simulation study with a unit marginal cost.
We see in Figure 4 (b) that the EQRE series fluctuates around the pure strategy
Nash equilibrium (D,D), meaning that there is a large probability of coordi-
nation on this outcome. Interestingly, when the cost of eﬀort becomes large
(γ = 10), we see a tendency of the equilibrium probabilities of playing outcome
C to increase for both players, such that the EQRE series has fluctuations closer
to the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the game. In other words, increas-
ing the marginal cost of eﬀort has decreased the probability of coordination on
outcome (D,D).
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Figure 2: (a) Time series of rationality indices. (b) Evolution of EQRE in Game 1.
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Figure 3: (a) Time series of rationality indices. (b) Evolution of EQRE for Game 1
with small marginal cost of eﬀort.
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Figure 4: (a) Time series of rationality indices. (b) Evolution of EQRE for the battle
of the sexes game.
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Figure 5: (a) Time series of rationality indices. (b) Evolution of EQRE for the battle
of the sexes game with large cost of eﬀort.
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Conclusion
This paper aims at enriching bounded rationality models by proposing two dif-
ferent ways for modeling the rationality index dynamics in quantal response
settings. After a brief literature review, we present the formal structure of
quantal response models and propose two extensions for endogenizing learning
eﬀects. The first “naive” approach is based on learning curve theory and con-
sists in giving a parameterized version of the evolution of the rationality index
over time. The second approach is more sophisticated and allows for hetero-
geneous players and endogeneous learning. More formally, each player has an
asymptotically consistent estimate of his rival’s rationality index and is able to
choose his own rationality level according to a cost-benefit tradeoﬀ.
We conclude the paper with a simulation study involving simple 2 × 2 games.
The results are motivating in the sense that the endogeneous quantal response
model is able to reproduce some experimental characteristics of learning. An
interesting future research direction would be to consider a time-dependent
sensitivity framework with respect to previous period rationality levels and to
implement laboratory experiments to test the EQRE theory.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
From the ij-response set RJi the probability that player i ∈ N will choose
action j is given by:
σij(u¯i) = P
￿
uˆij ≥ uˆik ∀k = 1, ..., Ji k ￿= j
￿
= P
￿
u¯ij + Eij ≥ u¯ik + Eik ∀k = 1, ..., Ji k ￿= j
￿
= P [Eik ≤ u¯ij − u¯ik + Eij ∀k = 1, ..., Ji k ￿= j
￿
= P
￿Ei1 ≤ u¯ij − u¯i1 + Eij , ..., Ei(j−1) ≤ u¯ij − u¯i(j−1) + Eij ,
Ei(j+1) ≤ u¯ij − u¯i(j+1) + Eij , ..., EiJi ≤ u¯ij − u¯iJi + Eij
￿
=
￿ +∞
−∞
￿
Ji￿
k=1
k ￿=j
P
￿Eik ≤ u¯ij − u¯ik + εij￿￿fi(εij) dεij
with pdf fi(εij) =
dFi(εij)
dεij
= λ exp(− exp(−λεij−γ)) exp(−λεij−γ), so we have
25
σij(u¯i) =
￿ +∞
−∞
￿
Ji￿
k=1
k ￿=j
exp(− exp(−λ(u¯ij−u¯ik+εij)−γ))
￿
λ exp(− exp(−λεij−γ)) exp(−λεij−γ) dεij
Let z = exp(−λεij − γ) , such that the above equation becomes
σij(u¯i) =
￿
+∞
0
￿
Ji￿
k=1
k ￿=j
exp(− exp(−λ(u¯ij − u¯ik))z)
￿
exp(−z) dz
=
￿ +∞
0
exp
￿
− z
￿
Ji￿
k=1
k ￿=j
exp(−λ(u¯ij − u¯ik))
￿￿
exp(−z) dz
=
￿ +∞
0
exp
￿
− z
￿
1 +
Ji￿
k=1
k ￿=j
exp(−λ(u¯ij − u¯ik))
￿￿
dz
= − 1
1 +
￿Ji
k=1
k ￿=j
exp(−λ(u¯ij − u¯ik))
exp
￿
−z
￿
1+
Ji￿
k=1
k ￿=j
exp(−λ(u¯ij−u¯ik))
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
+∞
0
= 0−
￿
− 1
1 +
￿Ji
k=1
k ￿=j
exp(−λ(u¯ij − u¯ik))
￿
=
1
1 + 1exp(λu¯ij)
￿Ji
k=1
k ￿=j
exp(λu¯ik)
=
exp(λu¯ij)￿Ji
k=1 exp(λu¯ik)
this completes the proof as we have recovered the expression given in (1.1). ￿
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Some statistical properties associated to estimated gains when
errors are Gumbel distributed
Lemma 2. Assume that the error structure of player i ∈ N follows (1.2) for
all j = 1, 2, ..., Ji. Then,
E(uˆij) = u¯ij
Var(uˆij) =
π2
6
λ−2
for all j = 1, 2, ..., Ji.
Proof. From the pdf fi(εij) = λ exp(− exp(−λεij − γ)) exp(−λεij − γ), we
can compute the expected value of the random shock of player i as follows
E(Eij) =
￿ +∞
−∞
εij λ exp(− exp(−λεij − γ)) exp(−λεij − γ) dεij
Using the substitution z = exp(−λεij − γ), we obtain
E(Eij) = − 1
λ
￿ +∞
0
(ln(z) + γ) exp(−z) dz
=
1
λ
￿
−
￿ +∞
0
ln(z) exp(−z) dz − γ
￿ +∞
0
exp(−z) dz
￿
where−
￿ +∞
0
ln(z) exp(−z) dz = γ ≈ 0.5772156 is the Euler-Mascheroni constant
such that we finally get E(Eij) = 1
λ
￿
γ−γ
￿
= 0 and so E(uˆij) = u¯ij+E(Eij) = u¯ij .
With regard to the variance, we have the following integral
V ar(Eij) =
￿ +∞
−∞
ε2ij λ exp(−exp(−λεij − γ)) exp(−λεij − γ) dεij
=
￿ +∞
0
1
λ2
￿
(ln(z))2 + γ2 + 2 ln(z)γ
￿
exp(−z) dz
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=
1
λ2
￿￿ +∞
0
(ln(z))2 exp(−z) dz + γ2
￿ +∞
0
exp(−z) dz + 2 γ
￿ +∞
0
exp(−z)ln(z) dz
￿
=
1
λ2
￿
γ2 +
π2
6
+ γ2 − 2 γ2
￿
=
π2
6
λ−2 ￿
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